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Statistical fluctuation problems are faced by all quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols under
finite-key condition. Most of the current statistical fluctuation analysis methods work based on
independent random samples, however, the precondition cant be always satisfied on account of dif-
ferent choice of samples and actual parameters. As a result, proper statistical fluctuation methods
are required to figure out this problem. Taking the after-pulse contributions into consideration,
we give the expression of secure key rate and the mathematical model for statistical fluctuations,
focusing on a decoy-state QKD protocol (Sci Rep. 3, 2453, 2013) with biased basis choice. On
this basis, a classified analysis of statistical fluctuation is represented according to the mutual re-
lationship between random samples. First for independent identical relations, we make a deviation
comparison between law of large numbers and standard error analysis. Secondly, we give a sufficient
condition that Chernoff bound achieves a better result than Hoeffdings inequality based on indepen-
dent relations only. Thirdly, by constructing the proper martingale, for the first time we represent
a stringent way to deal with statistical fluctuation issues upon dependent ones through making use
of Azumas inequality. In numerical optimization, we show the impact on secure key rate, the ones
and respective deviations under various kinds of statistical fluctuation analyses.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [1–3] can
provide unconditional security for telecommunications
based on the physical law of quantum mechanics [4–8].
However, in real-life QKD systems, there is a large gap
between the ideal conditions and the practical ones. In
order to figure out the problem, Gottesman et al. [9]
gave an intensive study aiming at the real system im-
perfections, and provided a key rate computation for-
mula called GLLP. Based on GLLP formula, decoy-state
protocols [10–13] were proposed so as to improve se-
cure key rate and detect photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack[14, 15]. For the first 20 years since the proposal
of BB84 protocol [1], QKD postprocessing procedure had
been mainly analyzed in the asymptotic assumption that
the length of transmission code is infinite. Nevertheless,
in real-world situations, the two parties often commu-
nicate within a limited time. As a result, many efforts
[4, 13, 16–26] have been spent on the finite-key effect in
QKD postprocessing schemes.
The security of QKD under finite-key condition was
first considered by Mayers [4], and soon afterwards, by
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using standard error analysis, Ma [13] gave a detailed
analysis concerning five kinds of statistical fluctuations.
Based on the work in [13, 27], Wei et al. [21] pro-
posed an efficient decoy-state QKD protocol with bi-
ased basis choice and adopted standard error analysis
to tackle statistical fluctuation problems. More recently,
Zhou et al. [23] proposed an improved statistical fluctua-
tion method in measurement-device-independent (MDI)
QKD also based on standard error analysis, which raises
the key rate of the recent Shanghai experimental set-up
[28] by more than 600 times.
Under universal composable (UC) [29] security which
is accepted and considered as the most stringent secu-
rity standard in classical and quantum fields, Scarani and
Renner [18] presented the finite-key QKD security analy-
sis using Law of large numbers [17, 18, 30]. By adopting
Law of large numbers to deal with statistical fluctua-
tion issues, Cai and Scarani [18] discussed the secure key
generation rate in their decoy-state protocol and obtain
the shortest sending code length for generating secure
key. Based on their research, Lucamarini et al. [24] used
beta distribution and CP test [31] to handle the finite-
key effects and gave an experimental verification for their
decoy-state QKD protocol.
By taking advantage of uncertainty relationship for
smooth entropies, Tomamichel et al. [19] provided an up-
per bound of the final key. Based on their work, through
utilizing Hoeffding’s inequality [32] to analyze statisti-
2cal fluctuations in decoy-state QKD protocol, Ref. [25]
achieved a good estimation result. Since then large devi-
ation theories [32, 33] have attracted lots of attentions in
dealing with statistical fluctuation problems. Applying
Chernoff bound [26, 33] to perform parameter estimation,
Curty et al. demonstrated the feasibility of long-distance
implementations of MDIQKD in finite-code length.
In most of the above QKD postprocessing schemes
lim2014concise [13, 18, 21, 25, 26, 34, 35] , the main
precondition of statistical fluctuation analysis is almost
the same, which requires an independent mutual rela-
tion between random samples. Renner [36] pointed out
that symmetry of large physical systems implies inde-
pendence of subsystems, thus the independent relation-
ship is reasonable as long as the systems physical prop-
erties are robust under small disturbances. However,
when it comes to after-pulse contributions, the detec-
tion event might be caused by the after-pulse of the prior
one. Many efforts have been spent on investigating after-
pulse [37, 38] and its effect [39, 40], concentrating on
the correlations of neighbouring pulses and the security
analysis. Somma et al.[39] demonstrated that if the in-
dependent condition is broken by after-pulse contribu-
tions, then the security parameters of decoy-state imple-
mentations could be worse, and they also pointed out
that the eavesdropper possesses the ability to correlate
her PNS attack which breaks the independent condition,
so that the corresponding security analysis would be in-
valid in the above mentioned protocols. Furthermore, the
after-pulse effect will lower the secure key rate, which is
even worse at higher gate frequencies because of a large
number of after-pulse-related errors[40]. As a result, the
after-pulse contributions cant be neglected, and we need
to find a stringent way to reconsider the security analy-
sis, especially statistical fluctuation issues based on de-
pendent random samples, which is the motivation behind
our analysis.
In this paper, we focus on the mathematical mod-
els, classifications and deviation comparisons for various
kinds of statistical fluctuation analyses, including stan-
dard error analysis, Law of large numbers, Hoeffdings
inequality and Chernoff bound. However, these methods
are not the accurate ways to deal with statistical fluc-
tuation issues when taking the after-pulse contribution
into consideration. In order to solve the problem, for the
first time we provide a new way called Azumas inequality
[35] to deal with dependent random samples. Since the
efficiency of a practical QKD system needs to care about
the total quantum resource consumption, it is important
to take the sending qubits as the total random samples.
The article is organized as follows. Section II gives an
analysis of after-pulse contributions based on Weis decoy-
state protocol [21]. III, we set up mathematical models
for standard error analysis and Law of large numbers
based on independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) ran-
dom samples, and present a deviation comparison. For
independent random samples only, we give a similar anal-
ysis for large deviation theories in section IV. In section
V, we bring a stringent way to solve the statistical fluc-
tuation issues on dependent samples. Simulations for se-
cure key rates and respective deviations of the five kinds
of estimation methods are given in section VI. At last,
some conclusions are presented in section VII.
II. ANALYSIS OF AFTER-PULSE
CONTRIBUTIONS
The after-pulse effect is due to carrier traps, and the
uncontrollable clicks will contribute to the quantum bit
error rate(QBER). To make a detailed analysis, here we
choose vacuum+weak decoy-state QKD protocol with bi-
ased basis choice [21]. Taking after-pulse contributions
into consideration, we need to reconsider the expected
detection rate, the yield of vaccum decoy-state yield and
the observed QBER.
A. Parameter description
Denoting pap as the after-pulse probability, here we
suppose pap = 4 × 10−2[25]. Then the parameters men-
tioned above change their expressions as follows.
Dµ = Qµ (1 + pap) = (1− e−ηµ (1− Y0)) (1 + pap)
Dν = Qv (1 + pap) = (1− e−ηv (1− Y0)) (1 + pap)
Y0
′ = 2pdc (1 + pap)
Eµ
′ = (
e0Y0
′+ed(1−eηµ)(1−Y0′)+papQµ/2)
Dµ
(1)
where Dµ, Dν , Y0
′ and Eµ′ respectively denote the over-
all gain of signal pulses, the weak decoy-state pulses,
the yield of vacuum decoy-state pulses and the observed
QBER under after-pulse impacts; η, pdc, e0 and ed rep-
resent the transmittance of the channel, the background
count rate, the background error rate and the probability
that a photon hits the wrong detector.
Further, we obtain the secure key rate
R ≥ q {Q0 +Qz1 [1−H (epz1 )]− leakEC}
leakEC = fECQµH(Eµ)
q =
Nµpz
Ntotal
Q0 = Y0
′e−µ
(2)
where q denotes the received signal state ratio; Q0 and
Qz
1
represent the background and the single photon gains,
e
pz
1 is the phase error rate of single photon signal state;
leakEC , fEC , Qµand Eµ separately denote the cost of
error correction, the bilateral error correction inefficiency,
the overall gain of signal state and quantum bit error rate
(QBER); H (x) = −xlog2 (x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x)is the
binary Shannon entropy function; Ntotal, Nµ, pz and Y0
are the length of the sending qubits, the signal pulses in
the basis, the probability that Bob chooses the basis, and
the background count rate.
In security analysis, we need to estimate the lower
bound of single photon yield denoted by Y1 and the up-
per bound of its relevant error rate e1 measured in the Z
3basis. Their expressions are
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
µ
µv − v2
(
Qve
v −Qµeµ v
2
µ2
− µ
2 − v2
µ2
Y0
′
)
(3)
and
e1 ≤ eU1 =
EvQve
v − e0Y0′
Y L1 v
. (4)
B. Mathematical model
Mathematical model for the corresponding statistical
fluctuation analysis considering after-pulse contributions
is discussed as follows. Let X denote the observed value,
which is obtained by detection events of m random sam-
ples denoted by X1, X2, · · · , Xm, detected with the value
1 and 0 otherwise, satisfying X = 1m
∑m
i=1Xi. E is the
expected value of 1m
∑m
i=1Xi when m tends to infinity.
Because of after-pulse contributions, we have the follow-
ing probability relations
Pr {Xm+1 = s|Xm = t,Xn−1 = xn−1, · · · , X1 = x1, X0 = x0} = Pr {Xm+1 = s|Xm = t} 6= Pr {Xm+1 = s} ,
(5)
which shows that the random samples are Markov chain.
Then for any and , we need to find a proper inequality
satisfying
Pr
(∣∣X − E∣∣ ≥ ξ) ≤ ε (6)
where the parameter can be seen as a function of . That
is to say the expected value is contained in the interval[
X − ξ,X + ξ] (7)
with a failure probability ε.
III. ANALYSIS OF I.I.D RANDOM SAMPLES
The purpose of this section is to make a deviation com-
parison between two kinds of analysis methods based on
i.i.d. random samples.
A. Standard error analysis
The original protocol adopts standard error analysis
which is the application of central-limit theorem using
Gaussian distribution to deal with the statistical fluctu-
ation problems. The application precondition is that the
random samples must be i.i.d. and the sum of them has
to obey Gaussian distributions. We denote ξ1(Sobs) as
the deviation when using standard error analysis, here
Sobs refers to the respective random samples. There are
four kinds of deviations corresponding to Wei’s protocol
defined in Appendix A.
B. Law of large numbers
Law of large numbers [30] mainly describes the stable
equivalence relation between occurrence frequency and
probability distribution when the test number is large
enough. Its application precondition only requires that
the random samples are i.i.d.. And the mathematical
model is stated as follows.
The only difference from the above mentioned one is
that the observed value X is obtained by detection events
of m i.i.d. random samples. Then for any ξ > 0 and
ε ≥ 0, a quantum version of law of large numbers yields
the following statement
Pr
(∣∣X − E∣∣ ≥ ξ ≡√ 2[ln( 1ε )+2 ln(m+1)]m
)
≤ ε, (8)
where ξ ≡
√
2[ln( 1ε )+2 ln(m+1)]
m . Applying law of large
numbers in dealing with statistical fluctuation problems
in Wei’s protocol, we obtain the relevant deviations de-
noted by ξ2(Sobs), which can be found in Appendix B.
C. Deviation comparison
Here we should point out that the quantile denoted
by uα in standard error analysis is determined by the
failure probability when applying the statistical fluctua-
tion analysis method. Thus, before making a deviation
comparison between the two methods, we need to set up
a fair comparison standard first. We set a fixed failure
probability no matter which method is used. Suppose
that the failure probability is ε = 10−10, which is equiv-
alent to taking the quantile as uα = 6.4. So we have to
change the quantile from uα = 5 in the original protocol
into uα = 6.4.
Given that the length of sending qubits is long enough
so that the sum of them satisfies Gaussian distribution.
Now we just take Qµ as an example and the respec-
tive deviations are ξ1 (Qµ) =
6.4√
NµpzQµ
and ξ2 (Qµ) =√
2[ln 1010+2 ln(Nµpz+1)]
NµpzQµ2
.
By some reduction, it equals to compare 6.4 ·√Qµ and√
46.06 + 4 ln(Nµpz + 1).
Since
√
Qµ < 1 and 4 ln(Nµpz + 1) > 0, then we can
obtain the following inequalities
√
46.06 + 4 ln(Nµpz + 1) >
√
46.06 > 6.4 > 6.4 ·√Qµ.
(9)
As a result, it can be safely concluded that the rela-
tionship between relevant deviations satisfies ξ1 < ξ2. In
other words, standard error analysis can achieve a better
estimation result than law of large numbers. The simu-
lation result is shown in V.
4IV. ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT RANDOM
SAMPLES
Large deviation theory [32, 33] describes the remote
tails’ asymptotic behavior of probability distribution se-
quences. That is to say, it concerns the exponential de-
cline of the probability measures of certain kinds of tail
events. It is a precise form of law of large numbers and
the main application precondition only requires the re-
lation of observed samples is independent. Here we take
two basic theorems to deal with the statistical fluctuation
issues concerning after-pulse contributions.
A. Hoeffding’s inequality
The theorem introduced first is called Hoeffding’s in-
equality [32], which provides an upper bound on the prob-
ability that the sum of independent random variables de-
viates from its expected value. A quantum version of
Hoeffding’s inequality yields the following statement.
Let X denote the observed value, which is obtained by
detection events ofm independent random samples. And
Xi are almost surely bounded, that is Pr (Xi ∈ [ai, bi]) =
1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.Then for any ξ > 0 and ε ≥ 0, the following
inequality holds
Pr
(∣∣X − E [X]∣∣ ≥ ξ) ≤ 2e
(
− 2m2ξ2∑m
i=1 (bi−ai)
2
)
= ε, (10)
here E
[
X
]
refers to the expected value of X.
Using Hoeffding’s inequality, we get the relevant devi-
ations denoted by ξ3(Sobs), which can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
B. Chernoff bound
The second theorem introduced here is called Chernoff
bound [33], also providing an upper bound on the proba-
bility that the sum of independent random variables de-
viates from its expected value. To apply the method in
Wei’s protocol, we changes the form mentioned in [26]
into the following claim.
Let X denote the observed value, which is obtained
by detection events of m independent random samples,
satisfying Pr(Xi = 1) = pi, X =
1
m
∑m
i=1Xi,and
a = E
[
X
]
= 1m
∑m
i=1 pi, where E [·] denotes the mean
value. Let x be the observed outcome of X and aL =
x −
√
1
2m ln
(
1
ε1
)
for certain ε1 > 0. For certain ε2,
ε3 ≥ 0, we have that x satisfies
x = a+ δ, (11)
except with error probability γ = ε1 + ε2 + ε3, where
δ ∈ [−∆,∆′]. Here ε2(ε3) refers to the probability that
x < a − ∆(x > a + ∆′). The limitations and corre-
sponding values of ∆ and ∆′ are given in Appendix C.
Employing Chernoff bound in Wei’s protocol, we obtain
the corresponding deviations denoted by ξ4(Sobs) in Ap-
pendix A.
C. Deviation comparison
In the definition of Chernoff bound, it can be easily
concluded that if the three conditions are not satisfied,
then Chernoff bound changes its form into Hoeffding’s
inequality. Here we only consider the situation that the
three conditions in Chernoff bounds are all fulfilled, and
the comparisons corresponding to the other results are
shown in Appendix B.
For convenience, we suppose ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 10
−10.
Still we take Qµ as an example and the respective devi-
ations are ξ3 (Qµ) =
√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε , ∆ =
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 16ε4 and
∆′ =
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 1
ε3/2
, here ξ3, ∆ and ∆
′ refer to the de-
viations when using Hoeffding’s inequality and Chernoff
bound.
Then if both
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 16ε4 ≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε and√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 1
ε3/2
≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε hold, we can safely say
that Chernoff bound can achieves a better result than
Hoeffding’s inequality.
Simplify the above inequalities, we obtain the sufficient
condition is
Qµ ≤ 0.06. (12)
V. ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT RANDOM
SAMPLES
Concerning the worst case that the after-pulse (maybe
caused by eavesdropper) exists in every detection event,
the mutual relationship between adjacent samples doesnt
satisfy the independent condition anymore. Therefore,
we need a stringent way to deal with the problem based
on dependent observed samples. Here we try to solve the
problem by constructing martingale [34] and bring Azu-
mas inequality [35] into statistical fluctuation analysis.
Detailed proof is shown in Appendix C. Here the quan-
tum version of Azumas inequality is presented as follows.
Let X denote the observed value, which is obtained
by detection events of m independent random samples,
Mn =
1
n ·
∑n
i=1Xi and M0 = E, here E is the value of
1
n ·
∑n
i=1Xi when n tends to infinity. Then for any ξ > 0
and ε ≥ 0, the following inequality holds
Pr (|Mn −M0| ≥ ξ) = Pr
(∣∣ 1
n ·
∑n
i=1Xi − E
∣∣ ≥ ξ)
≤ 2e−
n2ξ2
2
∑n
i=1
X2
i ,
(13)
with ξ =
√
2
n ln
2
ε . Applying Azuma’s inequality in solv-
ing the statistical fluctuation problems based on depen-
5dent samples, we get the relevant deviations denoted by
ξ5(Sobs) in Appendix A.
VI. SIMULATION
To obtain the impact on secure key rate of after-pulse
contribtions, we take Wei’s protocol as an example to see
the comparisons with and without after-pulse effect.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Plot of secure key rate R versus total
transmission loss t with and without after-pulse contributions.
The blue solid line denotes the secure key rate under after-
pulse impact, and the blue dotted line stands for the secure
key rate without after-pulse contributions. Here we take N =
6× 109, uα = 5.
Figure 1 shows that the secure key rate under after-
pulse impact is 75% lower than the one without after-
pulse contribution. As a result, the influence of after-
pulse on secure key rate can’t be neglected.
Take the after-pulse contribution into consideration,
we obtain the secure key rates under different statistical
fluctuation analysis methods in figure 2.
And the corresponding deviation comparisons are pre-
sented in figure 3.
From the above analysis, we get a clear comparison of
the estimation accuracy using different methods. And
for different relations of the observed samples, we should
choose the proper way to deal with statistical fluctuation
problems so as to get a precise result.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give a detailed analysis in dealing
with statistical fluctuation issues, based on independent
and dependent random samples. We set up respective
mathematical models for each estimation method and
give a fair comparison standard, together with the cor-
responding deviation comparisons. For the first time we
put forward a stringent way in handling the statistical
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Plot of secure key rate R versus to-
tal transmission loss t under different estimation methods.
The red lines denote the respective secure key rates with
N = 5 × 1010, and the blue lines refer to the ones with
N = 1012. The abbreviations respectively stands for Law
of large numbers (LLN), standard error analysis (SEA), Ho-
effding’s inequality (HI), Chernoff bound (CB) and Azuma’s
inequality (AI). Taking N = Ntotal ∈
{
5× 1010, 1012
}
, ε =
ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 10
−10, and uα = 6.4.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Plot of deviations comparisons versus
total transmission loss t under various estimation methods.
The blue lines from top to bottom respectively stands for
the deviations of Law of large numbers, Azuma’s inequal-
ity, denotes the deviations when using law of large num-
bers, Azuma’s inequality, Hoeffding’s inequality, Hoeffding’s
inequality , Chernoff bound and standard error analysis with
N = 1012.
fluctuations based on dependent samples. From the re-
sult of numerical simulation, we conclude that the after-
pulse impact cant be neglected since it greatly lowers the
secure key rate. And if the number of the totthe estima-
tion accuracy of standard error analysis is the best one
in the four methods. However, the large deviation the-
ory possesses more generality than standard error anal-
ysis. Although the secure key rate using Azumas in-
equality is a little lower than Hoeffdings inequality, its
6a strict tool dealing with fluctuation problems when tak-
ing after-pulse contributions into consideration, and can
be extended in other QKD protocols.
We emphasize that Azumas inequality is a stringent
way in dealing with statistical fluctuations based on de-
pendent samples, but not an efficient one. So there is still
more room for accuracy improvement in finding other
proper ways.
Appendix A: Respective deviations
Deviations under standard error analysis are repre-
sented as follows.
ξ1 (Qµ) =
uα√
NµpzQµ
ξ1 (Qv) =
Qvuα√
Nzv pzQv
ξ1
(
Y0
′) = uα√
N0Y
′
0
ξ1 (Q0) =
uα√
N0Q0
(A1)
where Qµ, Qv, Y0and Q0 are the observed values instead
of probabilities.
Deviations under Law of large numbers are represented
as follows.
QUµ = Qµ (1 + ξ2 (Qµ)) = Qµ +
√
2
[
ln
(
1
ε
)
+ 2 ln(Nµpz + 1)
]
Nµpz
QLv = Qv (1− ξ2 (Qv)) = Qv −
√
2
[
ln
(
1
ε
)
+ 2 ln(Nzv pz + 1)
]
Nzv pz
Y L0 = Y0
′ (1− ξ2 (Y0′)) = Y0′ −
√
2
[
ln
(
1
ε
)
+ 2 ln(N0 + 1)
]
N0
QL0 = Q0 (1− ξ2 (Q0)) = Q0 −
√
2
[
ln
(
1
ε
)
+ 2 ln(N0 + 1)
]
N0
(A2)
Deviations under Hoeffding’s inequality are repre-
sented as follows.
QUµ = Qµ (1 + ξ3 (Qµ)) = Qµ +
√
1
2Nµpz
ln
1
ε
QLv = Qv (1− ξ3 (Qv)) = Qv −
√
1
2Nzv pz
ln
1
ε
Y L0 = Y0
′ (1− ξ3 (Y0′)) = Y0′ −
√
1
2N0
ln
1
ε
QL0 = Q0 (1− ξ3 (Q0)) = Q0 −
√
1
2N0
ln
1
ε
(A3)
Deviations under Chernoff bound are represented as
follows.
QUµ = Qµ (1 + ξ4 (Qµ)) = Qµ +
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 16ε24
QLv = Qv (1− ξ4 (Qv))
= Qv −min
{√
1
2Nzv pz
ln 1ε1 ,
√
2Qv
Nzv pz
ln 1
ε33/2
}
Y L0 = Y
′
0
(
1− ξ4
(
Y0
′))
= Y0
′ −min
{√
1
2N0
ln 1ε1 ,
√
2Y0′
N0
ln 2
ε33/2
}
QL0 = Q0 (1− ξ4 (Q0))
= Q0 −min
{√
2
2N0
ln 1ε1 ,
√
2Q0
N0
ln 2
ε33/2
}
(A4)
Deviations under Azuma’s inequality are represented as
follows.
QUµ = Qµ (1 + ξ5 (Qµ)) = Qµ +
√
2
Nµpz
ln
2
ε
QLv = Qv (1 + ξ5 (Qv)) = Qv −
√
2
Nzv pz
ln
2
ε
Y L0 = Y
′
0
(
1 + ξ5
(
Y0
′)) = Y0′ −
√
2
N0
ln
2
ε
QL0 = Q0 (1 + ξ5 (Q0)) = Q0 −
√
2
N0
ln
2
ε
(A5)
Appendix B: Chernoff bound
When it comes to Chernoff bound theory, there are
three conditions satisfied or not corresponding to six dif-
ferent results.
i.
(
2ε−12
)1/maL ≤ e(3/4√2)2
ii.
(
ε−13
)1/maL ≤ e1/3
iii.
(
ε−13
)1/maL ≤ e[(2e−1)/2]2
Let f (x, y) =
√
2x
m2 ln
1
y , then we have the following
results.
(1) If condition (i) and (ii) are fulfilled, then ∆ =
f
(
x, ε42
/
16
)
and ∆ˆ = f
(
x, ε
3/2
3
)
.
(2) If condition (i) and (iii) are fulfilled, while (ii) not,
then ∆ = f
(
x, ε42
/
16
)
and ∆ˆ = f
(
x, ε23
)
.
(3) If condition (i) is fulfilled and (iii) not, then ∆ =
f
(
x, ε42
/
16
)
and ∆ˆ = f (m/4, ε).
(4) If condition (ii) is fulfilled and (i) not, then ∆ =
f (m/4, ε) and ∆ˆ = f
(
x, ε
3/2
3
)
.
(5) If condition (i) and (ii) are not fulfilled, while (iii)
is, then ∆ = f (m/4, ε) and ∆ˆ = f
(
x, ε23
)
.
(6) If condition (i) , (ii) and (iii) are not fulfilled then
∆ = ∆ˆ = f (m/4, ε).
The other deviation comparison results with Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality are stated here, also taking Qµ as an
example and ε1 = ε2 = ε3 = 10
−10.
(a) Deviation comparison between
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 16ε4 ,√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 1ε2 and
√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε , under result (2).
7The sufficient condition that Chernoff bound achieves
a better result than Hoeffding’s inequality is

√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln
16
ε4
≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln
1
ε√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln
1
ε2
≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln
1
ε
(B1)
This condition can be equivalently written as
Qµ ≤ 0.06. (B2)
(b) Deviation comparison between
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 16ε4 and√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε , under result (3).
Obviously, the condition is the same as (a).
(c) Deviation comparison between
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 1
ε
3
/2
and√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε , under result (4).
Here the sufficient condition is√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln
1
ε
3/2
≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln
1
ε
(B3)
And we have
Qµ ≤ 0.162. (B4)
(d) Deviation comparison between
√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln 1ε2 and√
1
2Nµpz
ln 1ε , under result (5).
Here the sufficient condition is√
2Qµ
Nµpz
ln
1
ε2
≤
√
1
2Nµpz
ln
1
ε
(B5)
And we have
Qµ ≤ 0.122. (B6)
(e) Chernoff bound changes its form into Hoeffding’s
inequality under result (6).
Appendix C: Detailed proof
First let’s look at the definition of Azuma’s inequality.
Definition:Let {Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn} be a martingale, and
suppose that there exists a sequence {X1, X2, · · · , Xn}
of real numbers such that Pr (|Yn − Yn−1| ≤ Kn) = 1 for
all n. Then
Pr (|Yn − Y0| ≥ ξ) ≤ 2e(− 12 ξ
2/
∑n
i=1 X
2
i ), ξ > 0. (C1)
Next we construct the martingale through analyz-
ing the mutual relationships between dependent sam-
ples. If the observed value X are obtained by detec-
tion events of m dependent random samples denoted by
X1, X2, · · · , Xm, detected with the value 1 and 0 other-
wise, satisfying X = 1m
∑m
i=1Xi. Considering after-pulse
contributions we have the following probability relations
Pr {Xm+1 = s|Xm = t,Xn−1 = xn−1, · · · , X0 = x0}
= Pr {Xm+1 = s|Xm = t}
6= Pr {Xm+1 = s}
(C2)
(D2) shows that the relationship of the samples sat-
isfies a Markov chain. And take signal pulse as
an example, we have P {Xm+1 = 1} = Qµm and
P {Xm+1 = 1 |Xm = t} = Dµm , here Qµm and Dµm
are the measured values of overall signal state gain
with and without considering after-pulse contributions,
when the number of observed samples is m, satisfying
Dµm = Qµm (1 + pap). Let Sn =
∑n
i=1Xi = k, then
Dµn =
Sn
n =
k
n . And we have the following relationship.
E(Sn+1 |Sn = k )
= k · P (Sn+1 = k |Sn = k )
+(k + 1) · P (Sn+1 = k + 1 |Sn = k )
= k · P {Xm+1 = 0 |Xm = t}
+(k + 1) · P {Xm+1 = 1 |Xm = t}
= k · (1−Dµn) + (k + 1) ·Dµn
= k +Dµn
= Sn +Dµn
(C3)
Let Mn =
Sn
n ,M0 = E , here E is the value of
1
n ·∑n
i=1Xi when n tends to infinity. We have
E(Mn+1 |S1, · · · , Sn) = E(Mn+1 |Sn )
= E(Sn+1n+1 |Sn )
= 1n+1E(Sn+1 |Sn )
= 1n+1 (Sn +Dµn)
= Sn+Sn/nn+1
= Snn =Mn
(C4)
From the above analysis we can conclude that Mn is a
martingale which can be used in Azuma’s inequality.
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